02/10/2024
CTI
Iran’s cyber and military initiatives are shaking the Middle East
The Middle East is the focus of attention following the attack on beepers and walkie-talkies supply chain.
Iran, a key player in the growing tensions in the region, could strengthen several levers:
- Its network of proxies, including Hezbollah, to which it has given its support.
- New alliances with certain countries.
- Direct and indirect military or cyber offensives.
Lessons to be learned? These dissensions are likely to involve the other Middle Eastern powers, as well as Europe and the United States.
Some news – What impacts on the rest of the world in 2024?
The upcoming American elections are raising concern regarding the state’s behaviour in cyberspace. Western media have disclosed hostile manoeuvres from Tehran designed to disturb the smooth running of events.
The conflicts in which Iran is involved imply geopolitical risks for French and European companies, particularly in certain sectors such as energy and supply chain. The risks involve disruption of business continuity due to conflicts’ impacts on key trade routes, which can lead businesses to reevaluate supply chain resilience and source tactics.
A new reformer president, Pezeshkian, was elected following the death of the ultraconservative Ebrahim Raisi. The new president is now advocating for warmer relations with Western powers, mostly regarding the nuclear deal and reducing the weight of the sanctions on the Iranian economy. He will have to compose with Iran being labelled as an enemy for a long time by the United States and the fact that foreign policy remains in the hands of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Iran a divisive power in the Middle East – Conducting proxy wars in the region
Iran’s population is primarily made up of f Shiites, one of the main currents of Islam, gathering 90% of its inhabitants. On the other hand, Sunnites represent about 10% of Iranians.
Tehran’s ambitions as a regional power can be observed in its foreign policy in the last decades.
First, the development of their nuclear capabilities makes them stand as a deterrent power and gives them a more influential voice in the global arena.
Iran wants to appear as a leader among Middle Eastern countries to counter the influence of the United States invoking their past status during imperial rule. It involves a combination of military power projection, proxy support, naval expansion and alliance-building.
Another characteristic is the religious leadership that Tehran would like to exert over its neighbours since the Islamic revolution of 1979 by promoting its interpretation of Shia islam forging alliances political groups aligning with their vision.
Lastly, Tehran projects its power overseas through military means by engaging in proxy wars defined as “conflicts in which a third party intervenes indirectly in order to influence the strategic outcome in favour of its preferred faction [1].”
[1] CREPY, Pauline. 2019. “Proxy Warfare’s Impact on Sectarianization: The Case of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry.”
Hasten cyber offensive capabilities – Recent data and threats of large-scale conflict
The improvement of their cyber capabilities is closely linked to its broader geopolitical goals in the Middle East and beyond. They complement Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategies, including proxy and shadow operations, allowing Tehran to perform transnational repression combining cyber operations, kidnappings and even homicides.
Cyber warfare is also a component of its “soft war” doctrine. Despite notable developments, Iran may still face challenges in matching those more established cyber powers, especially if the proxy war between Iran and Israel eventually triggers a larger conflict.
Iran’s cyber capabilities – A quick view of their organisation
Proxies in the Middle East – A network of allies
In 2024, it is estimated that Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with at least 150,000 rockets and missiles as well as 45,000 men (20,000 of them full-time employees) according to the CIA. Besides that, they managed to take part in the Lebanese government as well as in the economy. in Lebanon’s government and economic sector. However, the attacks against Hezbollah members, believed to have been orchestrated by Israel Intelligence Services will have major impacts on the organisation.
Iran supports Shiites in neighbouring countries. Proxies have long been sanctioned by the United States and some European countries (with nuances regarding their level of commitment) including the Shiite militia and political movement in Lebanon, the Hamas, a Sunni militia and political movement in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a Sunni militia in the Palestinian territories as well as leaders from groups supported by Tehran are also concerned.
A relationship with a proxy is often based on the supply of military equipment to the entity being courted. It’s always a triangular relationship where an identified group is invited to support one’s government in their fight against their rival(s), suggesting the existence of tensions. It’s especially convenient for governments looking to expand their regional influence at a relatively low cost and limited risks.
Estimated size of Iran proxies’ militias in 2024 – Proxies in the Middle East
Saudi Arabia: relentless ambition – Iran’s closest adversary
Although Iran doesn’t an extravagant defence budget military, these numbers do not reflect the reality of their respective strengths. Indeed, Saudi Arabia relies more on Western countries’ supplies, especially the United States, South Korea and Switzerland, while Iran can produce its own weapons, partly because international sanctions prohibit the transfer of military equipment Beyond domestic resources, allies’ capabilities should be considered as well.
Countries like Iran may appear to spend less, but their threat across the region grows nevertheless due to the way that their expenditure is leveraged. g. This poses a threat that cannot be neutralised by merely deploying another munition of a similar type; rather, the adversary must fight the weapon with several platforms, men, and intelligence. All in all, Iran gets better results considering the amounts invested.
Israel, the other big opponent – The one with the strongest ally
Israel’s position in the Middle East
Iran and Israel used to be allies before their relationship turned sour. As such, the Hamas appears as one of their chief proxies. Since 2020 and at a regional level, Israel is moving closer to the United Arab Emirates. This rapprochement is fuelled by a shared opposition to the growing Iranian and Turkish influence in the region. It has accelerated due to the desire of the American ally to reduce its military presence in the Middle East.
Contrary to the renewed diplomacy between Iran and Saudi Arabia, such moves are not likely to happen soon between Iran and Israel. In December 2023, two events indicated increased tensions between Jerusalem and Tehran:
The death of a senior Iranian official in Syria, killed in an attack attributed to Israel, caused renewed tension and fears of reprisals. After that, a joint operation led by Israel and the United States impeded the activity of 60% of the service stations, according to the Iranian Oil Minister, who denounced a « conspiracy ».
The search for new allies: the case of Russia
Like Israel has been collaborating with the United States to weaken Iran for years (Stuxnet, 2010), Russia and Iran have been working together to perform cyber offensive operations to target Israel. Moscow is a good asset for Tehran as it was considered the third most powerful country in terms of cyber capabilities in 2022. From a political perspective, these coordinated attacks send a strong message to Israel. Besides, Iran is also pressured to enhance its cyber standards to keep facing this enemy. Besides, Iranian APTs participated in targeting Ukraine since the start of the war. To that, we can add the potential support brought by Russian hacktivist groups who might benefit from Moscow’s laissez-faire, such as Anonymous Sudan.
Campaign example of Storm-1084 (DEV1084)
From a proxy’s point of view – Stay on course
An asymmetric relation
Proxies are not all about Iran providing them resources to defend their interests. They have priorities that may conflict with the objectives of their allies and which, in the end, will serve little or no purpose. This is particularly visible when it comes to the Hamas-Israel war where the Palestinian government must now put all of its efforts to survive and restructure their defence. In the end, Iran’s support can appear as opportunistic and redirected towards serving domestic goals.
The case of Bahrain
Although Iran can identify common interests with other states, the proxy strategy can sometimes fail. It was the case with Bahrain, which is caught between Iran and Saudi Arabia:
Even though Iran had long supported the Shia populations in Bahrain, this move has shown limited success.
Tehran renounced its claim over this territory and didn’t get international attention.
Recently, Manama even joined the UAE and Israel on their way to forge closer ties.
Changing the balance of power
Iran has long been under the pressure of economic sanctions and despite that, the government keeps placing proxies at the centre of their foreign policy. Therefore, when the government chooses to dedicate an entire budget to arm foreign entities, it generates a growing resentment among the population. This situation highlights a form of dependency between Tehran and its proxies which eventually could be used to the latter’s advantage.
Dependency
The number of resources supplied by Tehran is significant for proxies’ development. However, Iran also puts lots of hopes in these entities and can therefore become weaker in case of repeated failures and loss.
Benefits
Proxies can benefit from Iran by earning new equipment and training.
References
- Lane, Ashley. 2023. « Iran’s Islamist Proxies in the Middle East | Wilson Center ».
- Le Figaro. AFP. 2024. Iran : le président élu se dit prêt à un «dialogue constructif» avec l’UE.
- Lyngaas, Sean. PEREZ, Evan. Holmes, Kristen. 2024. CNN. Suspected Iranian hackers breached Roger Stone’s personal email as part of effort to target Trump campaign, sources say.
- Nelson, Nate. 2023. DarkReading. « Iran Threatens Israel’s Critical Infrastructure With “Polonium” Proxy ».
- Oualaalou, David. 2017. HuffPost. « Is Saudi Arabia and Iran on a Collision Course? ».
- Pfaff, Antony. 2019. Atlantic Council. How to counter Iran’s proxies.
- Petrović, Nikola. 2021. CeGIT. « Relations in the MENA region: Iran and Bahrain – CeGIT: Analysis ».
- Robinson, Kali. Merrow, Will. 2024. Council on Foreign Relations. « Iran’s Regional Armed Network ».
- Scollon, Michael. 2024. Iran’s Proxies, Partners Flex Weapons-Manufacturing Capabilities In Middle East.
- Shample, Steph. 2023. Middle East Institute. « Iranian APTs: An Overview ».
- Staff, ToI. 2021. The Times of Israel. « Microsoft Says Iran Hackers Targeting Israeli, US Defense Technology Firms ».
- Staff, Toi et AGENCIES. 2023. The Times of Israel. « Israel-Linked Group Claims Cyberattack That Shut down 70% of Iran’s Gas Stations ».
- The Economist. 2023. Iran’s proxies in the Middle East remain a powerful force ».
- United States Institute of Peace. 2023. « Report: Iran Accelerates Cyberattacks | The Iran Primer ».
- United States Institute of Peace. 2023. « Israel-Iran Cyber War, Gas Station Attack | The Iran Primer ».
- Voo, Julia. HEMANI, Irfan. CASSIDY, Daniel. 2022. Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center. National Cyber Power Index 2022.
- Wintour, Patrick. 2023. The Guardian. « How Iran Uses Proxy Forces across the Region to Strike Israel and US ».
- World Bank. « World Bank Open Data ».
- Young, Michael. 2018. Carnegie Middle East Center. « How Important Has Cyber Warfare Become to the States of the Middle East? ».
- Yun, Sun. 2023. The Arab Weekly. « Expectations Meet Reality for China’s Middle East Mediation | Yun Sun ». AW.
- Zorri, Diane, Houman, Sadri. David, Ellis. « Iranian Proxy Groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Principal-Agent Comparative Analysis ».
Frise
- July 2021
- October 2021
- November 2021
- September 2022
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards published footage from security cameras at two key Israeli ports
- July 2023
- August 2024
